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RECENT CASES
officers as to a "business invitation," but on the narrower criterion
of what constitutes the commission of an offense "in the presence" of
an officer. In Giannini v. Garland, the court held:
[If the officer by his presence becomes informed through any of his
senses of material elements of the particular crime, which has a
tendency to produce in the minds of a reasonably prudent person that
it is morally certain that the principal fact occurred, the offense may
be considered as having been committed in his presence, although he
did not discover all of the elements necessary to the completion of the
offense .... 17
This construction might have proved a safer and more workable guide
to future decision.
Conclusion
From an examination of the cited authorities, one must conclude
that the court has narrowly distinguished this case from a line of
previous cases with which it could have been soundly coupled. The
characterization of the officers as customers rather than trespassers
seems strained, particularly in the light of the provisions of the
Criminal Code which do not provide for an arrest without a warrant
for misdemeanors on reasonable belief. Certainly while a different
holding might have engendered cries of unnecessary protection of the
criminal element, it should be noted that there was no showing that
a warrant could not have been obtained, or any suggestion that the
delay would have allowed the quarry to escape. As to the argument
that such protection unduly frustrates effective law enforcement, the
Supreme Court has answered through Mr. Justice Jackson that:
We meet in this case, as in many, the appeal to necessity. It is said
that if such arrests and searches cannot be made, law enforcement
will be more difficult and uncertain. But the forefathers, after con-
sulting the lessons of history, designed our Constitution to place ob-
stacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance, which
they seemed to think was a greater danger to a free people than the
escape of some criminals from punishment.' 8
Donald D. Harkins
DomEsTc RELATIONS-ENFoRCEAB rY OF ANTENupTiAL CoNTRAcrs
CONCERNING THE RELIGIOUS TRAINING OF Cm:DREN-A Protestant
woman and a Catholic man, in contemplation of marriage, entered
into a contract whereby they agreed that their children should be
17296 Ky. 361, 366, 177 S.W. 2d 133, 135 (1944). Cf. Weaver v. McGovem,
122 Ky. 1, 90 S.W. 984 (1906); Dilger v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 550, 11 S.W.
651 (1889).
18 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
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reared in the religious faith of the husband. In a subsequent divorce
action the wife was awarded custody of their three minor children.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia, the husband argued
that even though the wife might be awarded custody of the children
the antenuptial contract should be enforced. Held: Since the right of
custody itself in divorce actions in Georgia is determined solely on the
basis of the welfare of the child', contracts concerning the religious
training of children are not binding on the court. Stanton v. Stanton,
213 Ga. 545, 100 S.E.2d 289 (1957) .2
Under the Canon Law of the Catholic Church,3 no priest can of-
ficiate at a marriage between a Catholic and a non-Catholic in the
absence of an agreement between the parties providing, among other
things, that any children born of the marriage will be reared in the
Catholic religion.4 Yet, a large proportion of the children born of
marriages between Catholics and Protestants are reared as Protestants.5
Probably the strongest reason for this contravention of the antenuptial
contract is that the young couple, eager to become man and wife, do
not fully realize the import of the agreement. Then, when the matter
comes up as to how the children shall be educated in matters of
religion, it is the parent who has taken the initiative in such matters
who determines the religion of the children. Since it is usually the
mother who accepts the responsibility for the religious training of
the children, 6 litigation is more likely to arise in a situation where
I Ga. Code Ann. sec. 74-107 (1935).
2 Although the issue as presented is of first impression in Georgia, it has been
considered in a few other states and the courts are generally in accord with the
principal case. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 20 Conn. Supp. 278, 132 A. 2d 420
(1957); Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N.W. 2d 491 (Iowa 1956); Brewer v. Cary, 148
Mo. App. 193, 127 S.W. 685 (1910); Boerger v. Boerger, 26 N.J. Super. 90, 97
A. 2d 419 (1953); Martin v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E. 2d 812 (1954);
annot., 12 A.L.R. 1153 (1921); see also Friedman, "The Parental Right to Control
the Religious Education of a Child," 29 Harv. L. Rev. 485 (1916); Pfeffer, "Re-
ligion in the Upbringing of Children," 35 B.U.L. Rev. 333 (1955). Contra,
Shearer v. Shearer, 73 N.Y.S. 2d 337 (Sup. Ct., 1947); Ramon v. Ramon, 34
N.Y.S. 2d 100 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1942); see also dictum in In re Luck, 10 Ohio
Dec. 1, 4 (Cuyahoga County Probate Court 1899).3 Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 100, 102 (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Ct. 1942).
4 "The Church may never permit Catholics to marry those of other religious
professions except under the twofold condition that the Catholic party will be
undisturbed in the free exercise of his or her religion, and that all the offspring
shall be brought up in Catholicism." Elmer, The Sociology of the Family, 192
(1945). An example of the type of contract involved is set out complete in
Peterson, Education for Marriage, 402 (1956).
5 From a study made by Judson T. Landis, it was discovered that more
than half of the children involved were raised as Protestants. Landis, "Marriages
of Mixed and Non-mixed Religious Faith," 14 Amer. Sociological Rev. 401, 405
(1949). Baber found in his study that children were raised as Protestants in the
ratio of three-to-one. Baber, Marriage and the Family, 103 (1953).
6 Baber, op. cit. supra note 5, at 104.
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both parties have strong religious convictions and the mother is the
non-Catholic.
7
At common law the rule was that the religion of the father de-
termined the religion in which the child would be educated.8 This
rule was enforced even after the father's death and even though the
effect was:
[T]o create a barrier between a widowed mother and her only child;
to annul the mother's influence over her daughter on the most im-
portant of all subjects, with the almost inevitable effect of weakening
it on all others; to introduce a disturbing element into a union
which ought to be as close, as warm, and as absolute as any known
to man; and lastly to inflict severe pain on both mother and child.9
What is the nature of the relationship created between mother and
child when the mother is a non-Catholic and she is ordered by the
Court to raise the child as a Catholic? In a recent case, the Supreme
Court of Iowa was called upon to review a judgment that a divorced
wife was guilty of contempt in failing to comply with the provision
of a divorce decree that the children "shall be reared in the Roman
Catholic Religion." The Court held that this provision was too in-
definite for enforcement:
What constitutes "rearing" a child in the religion or cultus of this
church, or of any church? Must he be taken to church once a week,
or once in two weeks, on Sunday? If mid-week services are held,
must he be taken to them? Is it required that he attend catechism
class? Must he attend a parochial school if the particular denomina-
tion in question maintains such schools? What fast days must be
observed, what Lenten observances followed? Would it be sufficient
if the child be required to conform to a part of these things, and if
so which part? Or are all of them required? The diffculty would
be the same, no matter what church might be named in such a decree
as the one now before us.10
Perhaps the Iowa court went to the extreme in propounding its
exhaustive list of questions, but it is generally recognized that Protes-
tants do not understand the fundamental concepts of the Catholic
faith. It has been said that people who have different religious beliefs
and practices walk different paths." A recent article in the Catholic
publication, America, calls up some of the more important distinctions
in the Catholic faith which Protestants generally fail to comprehend:
7 In all the reported cases here examined in which the issue has been directly
between living parents, the mother has been non-Catholic.
8 1 Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation, and Domestic Relations, sec. 776
(6th ed. 1921).
9 Hawkesworth v. Hawkesworth, L.R. 6 Ch. 539, 540 (1871).
10 Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N.W. 2d 491, 497 (Iowa 1956).
11 Schmiedeler, Marriage and the Family, 201 (1946).
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Catholics are amazed to find quite intelligent Protestants confusing
papal infallibility with impeccability, honor with adoration with regard
to the saints and the Blessed Virgin Mary, sacramental absolution
(which pre-supposes true repentance) with license to sin.12
Again in America, an article concerning the importance of Catholic
schools points out other misunderstandings:
[M]ost non-Catholics do not understand Catholic schools simply be-
cause they do not understand the Catholic Church. . . . They do
not appreciate the power of such profound theological doctrines as
that of the divinely commissioned teaching Church, the concept of
"Mother Church," the heritage of supernatural revelation.13
Would it be in the best interests of the child to demand that his
mother educate him in a religion other than that of the mother?
Could she be expected to impart to the child something which she
does not understand? There is the possible argument that she could
leave the matter of the religious education to the agencies of the
Church. Certainly the Church could do a great deal of good, but at
its best it is not an adequate substitute for the training which should
be given by a child's parent. "[T]he matter of rearing a child in any
religion is commonly, and we believe properly, thought to be a matter
of cooperation between church and home."14 And, again in America
an editorial reads:
Parents who leave it to the parish school to teach their children
catechism are making a real mistake .... The absence of a parent-
child-catechism relationship could not be made up by all the sisters
and brothers in the world. Not even the pastor, officially charged by
the Church with the religious education and guidance of all the souls
in his parish, can suitably substitute for the parents.15
Thus, if such a contract is enforced, the mother is faced with the
position of trying to inculcate into her child the discipline of a
religion which she cannot hope to understand. At most the religious
training of the child will be inadequate. It is impossible to estimate
the damage that can be done to the child. Can he hope to understand
why his religion should be any different than that of his own mother?
It would appear that it would be fruitless for the Court to attempt
to determine the right of custody solely on the basis of the child's
welfare when the Court is bound by an ante-nuptial contract to decree
that the child be brought up in a certain religion. The Superior
Court of New Jersey has put it this way:
12 Knight, "State Regulation of Independent Schools," 93 Amer. 263, 265
(1955).
13 McManus, "How Good are Catholic Schools?" 95 Amer. 522, 526 (1956).
14 Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N.W. 2d 491, 497 (Iowa 1956).
15 93 Amer. 259 (1955).
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The parent to whom custody is awarded must logically and naturally
be the one who lawfully exercises the greater control and influence
over the child. The mother, who lives with the child more than six
days a week, as contrasted with the father's limited visitation of a
few hours on Sunday, is the one who actually rears the child and
shapes its moral, mental, emotional and physical nature. To create
a basic religious conflict in the mind of the child, and between it
and its custodian, would be detrimental to its welfare.16
Ohio'17 and New York are the only states in which Courts have ex-
pressed any favor toward the enforceability of the contracts. The
Domestic Relations Court, City of New York, in an opinion handed
down in 1942, held that an antenuptial contract concerning the re-
ligious training of children was enforceable on the ground that there
was a property right created in the Catholic party upon the execution
of the agreement between the parties.'8 There was no indication in
the report that any consideration had been given to the welfare of
the child concerned. However, the New York Court of Appeals has,
in a later decision, ruled that such contracts are unenforceable when
it is shown that enforcement will be detrimental to the welfare of the
child.19
It would appear that the majority view adopted by the Georgia
Court is more in keeping with the American concepts of separation
of Church and State and freedom of religion.20 The Courts should
not presume that the welfare of the child will be unimpaired if the
child's custodian is forced to rear him in a religion other than that of
the custodian. The contract should be disregarded altogether. The
question of religious training should be considered at the custody
16 Boerger v. Boerger, 26 N.J. Super. 90, 97 A. 2d 419, 427 (1953).
17 The Cuyahoga County Probate Court in granting custody of two orphaned
children, of a deceased Catholic mother and Protestant father, preferred their
uncle by marriage on the father's side to an uncle on the mother's side, but,
expressed the opinion that if the issue had been between father and mother, the
court would be bound to enforce the contract. In re Luck, 10 Ohio Dec. 1, 4-5
(1899). But see Hackett v. Hackett, 146 N.E. 2d 477 (Ohio 1957) where the
Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County, Division of Domestic Relations, held
that such contracts are void.
18 "The ante-nuptial agreement made by respondent and petitioner clearly
contemplated the preservation of the spiritual rights and status of the respondent
and those of his prospective children. These rights though spiritual and intangible
became for all purposes just as real, protective and enforceable as pertained to
any physical property." Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 100, 104 (N.Y. Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1942).
19 Martin v. Martin, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E. 2d 812 (1954), affirming 283
App. Div. 721, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 851. A divided court felt that the welfare of the
child would be impaired if the contract were enforced.
20 This paper has not been concerned with the constitutional issue, but for
the proposition that the contracts are unconstitutional, see Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78
N.W. 2d 491, 500 (Iowa 1956). For the proposition that failure to enforce the
contracts is unconstitutional, see Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 100, 112 (N.Y.
Dom. Rel. Ct. 1942).
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hearings along with other circumstances which cause the Court to
award custody. Then when custody is determined, the custodian
should normally be left free to decide in what religious faith the child
will be raised. The court's duty would be fulfilled by considering
whether any religious training would be made available to the child
and the importance of a particular kind of religious training in relation
to the other circumstances of the case.
Billy R. Paxton
PLEADING-STATUTE OF LuirrATIONS-RELATION BACK OF AN A mND-
NMNT CHANGING =rn DE NANr-Plaintiff brought an action against
the individual members of the Harlan County Board of Education,
alleging that he was injured by the gross negligence of a truck driver
who was an employee of the board acting within the scope of his
employment.' After the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, plaintiff amended
his complaint making the Harlan County Board of Education de-
fendant.2 However, the amendment was made more than one year
after the alleged injury.3 The circuit court dismissed the original
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted and dismissed the amended complaint as barred by the statute
of limitations. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Held: Affirmed. Gilbert v. Harlan County Board of Education, 809
S.W.2d 771 (Ky. 1958).
County boards of education in Kentucky are quasi municipal
corporations.4  Members of a county board of education are in-
dividually liable for tort injuries resulting (1) from their failure to
perform a specific ministerial act involving no discretion which is
expressly required by statute and (2) from their failure to exercise
ordinary care to employ a person qualified to perform the work for
I The defendants in the original complaint were named as follows:
"James Green, (the truck driver) James Cawood, Supt. Carson
Coleman, Board Member, Paul Graham, Board Member, Caleb Creech,
Board Member, Dr. S. H. Rowland, Board Member, J. S. Hensley
Board Member of the Harlan Educational Board."
Gilbert v. Harlan County Board of Education, 809 S.W. 2d 771 (Ky. 1958).
2 The amended complaint designated the defendants as follows:
"Harlan County Board of Education Consisting of James Cawood,
Supt. and Carson Coleman, Paul Graham, Caleb Creech, Dr. S. H.
Rowland, J. S. Hensley Board Members."
Id. at 771-72.
3 The Statute of Limitations for such actions is one year. Ky. Rev. Stat. sec.
413.140(a) (1956).4 "Each board of education shall be a body politic and corporate with
perpetual succession. It may sue and be sued ... " Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 160.160
(1956). See also, Board of Education of Kenton County v. Talbott, 286 Ky. 543,
549, 151 S.W. 2d 42, 45 (1941).
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